Monday, July 20, 2015

Yanis Varoufakis — Europe’s Vindictive Privatization Plan for Greece

 How is this not naked looting? This isn't even a fig leaf.

On July 12, the summit of eurozone leaders dictated its terms of surrender to Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, who, terrified by the alternatives, accepted all of them. One of those terms concerned the disposition of Greece’s remaining public assets.

Eurozone leaders demanded that Greek public assets be transferred to a Treuhand-like fund – a fire-sale vehicle similar to the one used after the fall of the Berlin Wall to privatize quickly, at great financial loss, and with devastating effects on employment all of the vanishing East German state’s public property.

This Greek Treuhand would be based in – wait for it – Luxembourg, and would be run by an outfit overseen by Germany’s finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, the author of the scheme. It would complete the fire sales within three years. But, whereas the work of the original Treuhand was accompanied by massive West German investment in infrastructure and large-scale social transfers to the East German population, the people of Greece would receive no corresponding benefit of any sort….

Project Syndicate
Europe’s Vindictive Privatization Plan for Greece
Yanis Varoufakis, former finance minister of Greece, is Professor of Economics at the University of Athens
When questioned in parliament in 1999 about whether he had accepted a donation during a meeting with Schreiber, Schäuble disputed the question. But in a radio interview in January, he admitted he had met Schreiber at least once more. That created suspicion that a second donation had been made. Whatever the case, indignation within the ranks of the CDU and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU) toward Schäuble grew so much that he was forced to resign.

So how exactly did Merkel profit from the Schreiber incident? The former party secretary became aware that, in the face of an unexpected question in parliament, Schäuble had lied about taking cash from Schreiber. Merkel realized at the time that this secret would eventually come out and would inevitably lead to Schäuble's downfall. She also knew that, if she wasn't careful, she could go down with him. After all, it was only logical that the general secretary of a party would have the confidence of the head of that party.
And so she wrote about it -- in what was widely described as a "Dear John" letter addressed to Kohl and published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper on Dec. 22, 1999. In the letter she was very critical of Kohl, saying that the new generation of politicians in the CDU needed to distance themselves from him, in the same way that teenagers must distance themselves from their parents if they are to become adults. Even though Merkel had only told Schäuble about plans to publish the open letter the night before, Kohl was convinced that the missive had been published with Schäuble's foreknowledge and approval.

Suddenly Kohl seemed to discover his old political boisterousness, attacking Schäuble ever more vigorously. Perhaps he wanted to secure a virtuous place in the national history as the "father of German unity" -- he had presided over the re-unification of East and West Germany -- rather than the infamous politician with the dirty donations. A war of words, via various interviews, ensued, the likes of which had not been seen before. The fight between the two former friends and allies escalated to the point that Kohl abdicated his seat as honorary chairman of the CDU and Schäuble resigned his position with the words: "The CDU finds itself in the most serious crisis in its history."
The scrap between Kohl and Schäuble, the pair that had formerly been bound with an invisible cord, toppled both of them off the pedestal on which they had formerly stood together. And there, waiting quietly in the wings, was Merkel.
Spiegel Online International (August 7, 2009)
Germany's Schreiber Affair: The Scandal that Helped Merkel Become Chancellor
Gerd Langguth

See also Jeff Sachs, Germany, Greece, and the Future of Europe

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